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SUMMARY
The 108th Congress is addressing a broad
range of civilian, military, and commercial
space issues.
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
visible space activities. NASA’s FY2004
budget request is $15.5 billion. NASA
requested $15.0 billion for FY2003; Congress
approved $15.3 billion (adjusted for the 0.65%
across-the-board rescission, from which the
shuttle program was exempted).  The loss of
the space shuttle Columbia on February 1,
2003, is dominating debate over NASA’s
future. The space shuttle’s primary mission for
the foreseeable future is taking crews and
cargo to and from the International Space
Station (ISS).  The two programs are inextri-
cably linked, and Congress and the Adminis-
tration face many issues, both near-term and
long-term, about the shuttle and ISS. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has
a less visible but equally substantial space
program.  Tracking the DOD space budget is
extremely difficult since space is not identi-
fied as a separate line item in the budget.
DOD sometimes releases only partial
information (omitting funding for classified
programs) or will suddenly release without
explanation new figures for prior years that
are quite different from what was previously
reported.  The most recent figures from DOD
show a total (classified and unclassified) space
budget of $15.7 billion for FY2002, $18.4
billion for FY2003, and a FY2004 request of
$20.4 billion.  DOD space issues include
management of programs to develop new
early warning and missile tracking satellites,
and management of military and intelligence
space activities generally.
The appropriate role of the government
in facilitating commercial space businesses is
an ongoing debate.  For many years, the focus
has been on commercial space launch ser-
vices, but commercial remote sensing satel-
lites also pose complex questions in terms of
encouraging the development of commercial
satellites that provide high quality data, while
protecting national security.  President Bush
signed a new commercial remote sensing
policy on April 25, 2003 that tries to strike a
balance between those objectives.
Space launch vehicles are similar to
ballistic missiles and concerns exist about the
potential transfer of certain space technologies
to countries intending to build missiles.  U.S.
linkage between space cooperation and adher-
ence to the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime was a significant factor in reaching
agreement on cooperative and commercial
space activities with Russia, and creates a
complex relationship with China depending
on the political relationship between China
and the United States.
International cooperation and competi-
tion in space are affected by the world eco-
nomic situation and the post-Cold War politi-
cal climate.  President Clinton’s 1993 decision
to merge NASA’s space station program with





The Bush Administration is requesting $15.469 billion for NASA in FY2004, a 3.1%
increase above the FY2003 request, or approximately 1% above the $15.339 billion
appropriated for FY2003  (adjusted for the 0.65% across-the-board rescission for all NASA
activities except the space shuttle). On February 1, 2003, NASA’s space shuttle Columbia
broke apart during its descent from orbit following a 16-day science mission.  CRS Report
RS21408 discusses the Columbia tragedy.   Until the cause of the accident is known, and
remedial steps identified, it is difficult to forecast the impact on NASA, the space program,
or the FY2004 budget request. 
DOD is requesting $20.4 billion for space programs (classified and unclassified) for
FY2004, compared with its FY2003 appropriation of $18.4 billion.  Among the programs
receiving congressional attention are:  DOD’s efforts to develop new satellites for detecting
the launch of, and tracking, foreign missiles—SBIRS-High and the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System; assured access to space; plans to develop a new space-based radar
system; and development of “space control” capabilities and “counterspace” systems to
protect U.S. satellites and to deny the use of space to adversaries.  The Senate Armed
Services Committee reported the FY2004 DOD authorization bill on May 13 (S. 1050,
S.Rept. 108-46).  The House Armed Services Committee reported its version on May 16
(H.R. 1588, H.Rept. 108-106).
President Bush signed a new satellite commercial remote sensing policy on April 25,
2003, superseding the Clinton Administration’s policy from 1994 (PDD-23).  It requires U.S.
government agencies to use commercial sources of imagery to the maximum extent possible,
and encourages U.S. companies to build and operate commercial remote sensing satellite
systems that are superior to current or planned foreign commercial systems, subject to
government regulation.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568, the “NASA Act”) symbolized
the entrance of the United States into the space age.  The Soviet Union had successfully
orbited the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957, lending the U.S. space
program a new urgency.  The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1 (developed and launched by the
Army), was orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures of the Naval Research
Laboratory’s Vanguard rocket.  President Eisenhower’s desire to separate military and
civilian space activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the civilian NASA on




Human Spaceflight and Space Launch Vehicles.  The Soviets achieved another
space “first” on April 12, 1961, when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth.
The United States responded by launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5 (though he
made only a suborbital flight; the first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in
February 1962).  Following Shepard’s flight, President Kennedy announced that the United
States intended to put a man on the Moon within a decade, a goal accomplished on July 20,
1969 when Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin walked on the Moon (a total of six 2-man crews
walked on the Moon through 1972).  Apollo was followed by the Skylab space station (to
which 3 crews were sent in 1973-1974) and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in which
a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with 3 astronauts and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft with 2 cosmonauts
docked for 2 days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s space shuttle program to develop a reusable
spacecraft for taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit.  The first shuttle flight occurred in
1981 and the system was declared operational in 1982.  The Challenger tragedy in January
1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months.  Flights resumed in 1988, but on February
1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth.  An investigation is
underway (see CRS Report RS21408).   Until the cause of the accident is discovered, and
remedies identified, the impact of the Columbia tragedy cannot be usefully assessed. The
space shuttle is discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
In 1984, President Reagan directed NASA to build a permanently occupied space
station “within a decade.”  The space station has been very controversial since it began.
Twenty-two attempts in Congress since 1991 to terminate the program in NASA funding
bills have failed.   In 1988, Europe, Canada and Japan agreed to be partners with the United
States in building the space station.  Redesigned and rescheduled repeatedly, President
Clinton called for yet another redesign in 1993 and later that year merged NASA’s space
station program with Russia’s.  That program, the International Space Station (ISS), is
currently underway (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).   Six major modules and other hardware
are in orbit, and the station has been permanently occupied since November 2000.  From then
until May 2003, three-person crews rotated on 4-6 month shifts.  Following the Columbia
accident,  crew size has been reduced to two in order to reduce resupply requirements while
the shuttle fleet is grounded.  Crews and cargo can be taken to the space station by Russian
Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, respectively.   The Russian Soyuz spacecraft remain docked
to the station as “lifeboats,” and must be replaced every 6 months.  Thus, the two-person
crews will be rotated at 6-month intervals.  Although returning the shuttle to flight status is
the focus of attention currently, once it resumes service, issues surrounding the space
station’s future remain to be addressed.  For example, in 2001, cost growth led the Bush
Administration to decide to truncate construction of ISS at a phase it calls “core complete.”
If that decision is maintained, ISS crew size could not increase to seven as planned, affecting
how much scientific research can be conducted there, as well reducing the number of
opportunities for astronauts from all partners in the program to be members of ISS crews.
How much of the space station to build, and how to ensure that all the partners can make use
of it, remains to be resolved.
The space shuttle is NASA’s sole means of launching humans into space.  NASA,
sometimes in concert with DOD, has been attempting since the 1980s to develop a
replacement for the it, expecting to phase out the shuttle in 2012.  Those programs were not
successful, however, and in November 2002,  NASA announced that it would keep the
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shuttle operational at least until 2015, and perhaps until 2020 or longer.  What impact the
Columbia tragedy will have on that decision is not yet known.  See CRS Issue Brief IB93062
for more information on the shuttle.
Science Programs.  NASA has launched many spacecraft for space and earth
science.  Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts, and have visited
all the planets in the solar system except Pluto, and a mission to Pluto is expected to be
launched in 2006.   Many of the probes have been quite successful, but there were failures,
too. In 1999, for example, two NASA Mars missions failed, at a combined cost of $328.5
million.  They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to scientific
spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information, but take
longer and cost more to build.    The FBC approach was subsequently scrutinized and NASA
restructured its Mars exploration program significantly.  Instead of launching orbiter-lander
pairs in 2001 and 2003 and a sample-return mission in 2005, NASA launched an orbiter in
2001 (Mars Odyssey) which is now orbiting that planet, and plans to launch twin landers in
2003, an orbiter in 2005, and additional spacecraft through the remainder of the decade.
Plans for a sample-return mission in the first half of the next decade have been terminated.
NASA also has sent, or plans to send, spacecraft to other planets, comets, and asteroids.
Space-based observatories in Earth orbit have studied the universe since the 1960s,
creating new fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths
(such as x-rays and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere.  In the 1980s,
NASA embarked upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of
the electromagnetic spectrum.  Three have been launched: Hubble Space Telescope,
launched April 1990 (for the visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory,
launched April 1991, deorbited June 2000; and Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July
1999.  The fourth, Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), was reduced in size because
of budgetary issues.  It is scheduled for launch in 2003.
NASA also has solar-terrestrial physics programs that study the interaction between the
Sun and the Earth.  In FY2001, NASA began the Living with a Star program that envisions
the launch of many spacecraft over the next decade to obtain more accurate information on
how the Earth and society are affected by what has come to be known as “space
weather”—including, for example, negative effects of solar activity on telecommunications.
The 1960s witnessed the development of communications and meteorological satellites
by NASA, and in the 1970s, land and ocean remote sensing satellites.  NASA’s role in this
aspect of space utilization traditionally is R&D.  Once the technology is proven, operational
responsibility is transferred to other agencies or the private sector. NASA continues to
perform research in many of these areas.  NASA’s major environmental satellite research
program today is the Earth Observing System (see Environment).
NASA also has an Office for Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) that conducts
research related to ensuring that humans can live and work safely and effectively in space,
and for fundamental research that can be conducted in microgravity environments.  The
space shuttle Columbia’s final mission (STS-107) was devoted in large part to OBPR
experiments.  The loss of much of the data acquired during Columbia’s 16-day mission, and
the impact of that tragedy on scientific use of the space station while the shuttle fleet is
grounded, are challenges currently facing OBPR.
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Other Civilian Government Agencies
Beginning in the 1960s, other civilian agencies became involved in space.  At that time,
operation of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce.  The Landsat land
remote sensing satellite system was transferred to NOAA in 1979.  (Later, NOAA oversaw
private sector operation of the system, but in 1992, Congress moved the program back into
the government; see below).  The Department of Commerce  is involved in space issues due
to its role in trade policy and export of items on the Commerce Control List, and has an
Office of Space Commercialization to facilitate commercial space businesses.  In 1983, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) was given responsibility for facilitating and regulating
commercial launch services companies.  This function is performed through the Federal
Aviation Administration.  DOT and DOD co-chair a group that oversees use of DOD’s
Global Positioning System of navigation satellites.  DOT represents civilian users and has
programs to augment the system’s utility to the civilian community.  Other government
agencies involved in space include the Department of Energy, which develops nuclear power
sources for satellites; the U.S. Geological Survey in the Department of Interior which
operates the Landsat satellites; the Departments of Agriculture and other departments that
use satellite data for crop forecasting and map making, for example; and the Department of
State, which develops international space policy and determines whether to grant export
licenses for items on the Munitions List (including some types of spacecraft and launch
vehicles).  The National Security Council,  the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, also are involved.
Commercial Space Programs
Civilian communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to commercialize
other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success.   Congress has passed several
laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch services for putting satellites into
orbit (the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988 Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments, and the 1998 Commercial Space Act).  The development of a U.S. commercial
launch services industry has been largely successful.  DOD and NASA continue to play a
strong role in developing new launch vehicles, though private companies are partnering with
the government or developing their own.  The most controversial issues are the relative roles
of the government versus the private sector in developing new systems, ensuring that U.S.
companies can compete with foreign launch services companies, and trade and missile
proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for launch. See CRS
Issue Brief IB93062.
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites
by privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365).   Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
uses. After a tumultuous 8 years that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress
repealed that Act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-555), bringing Landsat back under government sponsorship.  The Act also promoted
development of new systems by the private sector.  Coupled with a 1994 Clinton
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Administration policy, these actions led several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build
remote sensing satellites and offer imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must
obtain an operating license from  NOAA for such systems.  The first successful launch of a
commercial imaging satellite, Space Imaging’s Ikonos 2, was achieved in September 1999.
The market for commercial satellite remote sensing products continues to be limited,
however, and U.S. companies reportedly are struggling to remain in business.  Partially in
response to that concern, President Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy on
April 25, 2003 [http://www.ostp.gov/html/mew/html] that is intended to maintain the
nation’s leadership in remote sensing space activities and sustain and enhance the U.S.
remote sensing industry.  The Bush policy encourages companies to build and operate
commercial remote sensing satellite systems that are superior to current or planned foreign
systems, subject to government regulation, and possible additional controls and safeguards
if the U.S. government is a user (e.g. satellite, ground station, and communications link
protection measures to ensure the U.S. Government can rely on the systems). 
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses
complicates this commercial space effort, however.   Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, two operating U.S. private sector satellites, Ikonos 2 (owned by
Space Imaging) and QuickBird (owned by DigitalGlobe), produce imagery with 1 meter and
0.6 meter resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size), respectively,
and commercial satellites with even better resolution are expected (Space Imaging has a
license to build a satellite with 0.4 meter resolution, and is requesting permission to build one
with 0.25 meter resolution). Competitors to U.S. commercial satellite imaging companies
include French, Russian,  Indian, and Israeli companies that offer imagery with 2.5-meter,
1-meter, 1-meter, and 1.8-meter resolution respectively.  One major issue is when the
government can exercise  “shutter control,” forcing companies to discontinue obtaining or
distributing imagery of certain parts of the world in times of crisis.  DOD took a different
approach to controlling access to imagery when the United States initiated attacks in
Afghanistan.  For two months, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) bought
exclusive rights to Ikonos imagery of that area from Space Imaging so that no one else could
use the data without NIMA’s approval.  The practice was dubbed “checkbook shutter
control” in the media.  Some groups complained that the media and relief agencies need that
data, too.  The government apparently has not attempted to limit access to commercial
satellite imagery during the Iraqi war. Another issue is the government’s role in controlling
to whom the imagery is sold and which countries may invest in the U.S.-owned systems.
U.S. companies want time limits on how long the government can take to decide whether
particular sales or investments will be permitted so they can make wise business decisions.
Under the 1992 Landsat Act, the Commerce Department has 120 days to accept or reject
license applications.  However, Commerce must consult with other agencies, including the
Departments of State and Defense, and those departments have no time limits.   The new
Bush policy states that the government will provide a timely and responsive regulatory
environment. 
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel.  On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (a U.S. system, subsequently renamed Orbview, that was to be built by Orbital
Sciences Corporation) that could be used against Israel would be made available to Saudi
Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and would be the location of
a ground station.   The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 104-201) included language
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prohibiting the collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources. 
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes.  The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have strongly encouraged NIMA to purchase commercial
imagery to augment classified imagery. The January 2001 report of the Independent
Commission on NIMA (see Military Space Issues) strongly endorsed NIMA acquisition of
commercial imagery, and supported the proposal to allow private sector companies to build
satellites with half-meter resolution.  The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to
utilize U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national security
purposes, to the maximum extent practicable.  Foreign commercial remote sensing space
capabilities may be used consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives.  
Other potential commercial space activities are microgravity materials processing
(making products such as purer pharmaceuticals by utilizing the microgravity conditions in
space), space tourism, and space facilities such as Spacehab’s modules that fly inside the
space shuttle’s cargo bay for scientific experiments or carrying cargo.
Military Space Programs
The creation of NASA was a deliberate step by President Eisenhower to separate
military and civilian space activities.  Among other things, he wanted to stress that the United
States was interested in the peaceful uses of space, but recognized that space had military
applications as well.  The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military
space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD).  The intelligence
community (coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence) makes significant use of
space-based intelligence collection capabilities, and participates in managing satellite
reconnaissance programs through the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency
within DOD.  NRO builds and operates intelligence collection satellites, and collects and
processes the resulting data.  The data are provided to users such as NIMA and the National
Security Agency (NSA).  The Undersecretary of the Air Force is the Director of NRO, the
Air Force acquisition executive for space, and DOD’s executive agent for space.
DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities,
including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the
Global Positioning System—GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to
foreign missile launches, weather satellites,  reconnaissance satellites, and developing
capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries
(called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is
dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great
improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam.  These
systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations, including the 2003
Iraqi war and the war against terrorism.
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The Bush Administration abolished U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) in 2002
when it reorganized the unified command structure largely in response to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks.  USSPACECOM was created in 1985 as a unified command to
oversee space operations.  The  Commander of USSPACECOM was also the Commander
of the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). On October
1, 2002, a new Northern Command was created for homeland defense, and its Commander
assumed command of NORAD.  USSPACECOM was merged with U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), which is now  responsible for early warning of, and defense against,
missile attacks and long range conventional attacks.  USSTRATCOM has three space
components: Army Space Command, Naval Space Command, and Space Air Force (the 14th
Air Force, headquartered at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA).   Air Force Space Command
is a major Air Force command headquartered at Peterson AFB, CO. 
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
matters has been an issue for several years.  In three separate FY2000 funding bills, Congress
established commissions to review the NRO (in the FY2000 intelligence authorization act,
P.L. 106-120); NIMA (in the classified annex to the FY2000 DOD appropriations act, P.L.
106-79); and overall U.S. national security space management and organization (in the
FY2000 DOD authorization act, P.L. 106-65).   The NRO, NIMA, and “Space Commission”
reports are discussed below.
Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the
functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.
Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance
satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have
similar technology.  The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military,
civilian, or commercial satellite.  DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa.  The
current Administrator of NASA, Mr. Sean O’Keefe, is a former Secretary of the Navy and
is seeking closer cooperation between DOD and NASA.
DOD and NASA both develop space launch vehicles.  The Delta, Atlas, and Titan
launch vehicles were all initially developed by DOD, while NASA developed Scout and
Saturn (both no longer produced), and the space shuttle. All except the shuttle are
“expendable launch vehicles” (ELVs) that can only be used once (the shuttle is reusable).
An August 1994 Clinton Administration policy gave DOD responsibility for maintaining and
upgrading the ELV fleet, while NASA maintains the shuttle and develops new reusable
launch  technology.  Some expect that a space policy review now being conducted by the
National Security Council (see below) will modify that policy so that each agency can invest
in developing new expendable and reusable launch technologies.
After the Cold War ended, DOD and congressional interest in space weapons, both
those to attack other satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons) and weapons based in space
to attack ballistic missiles, declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the 104th
Congress.  Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since President
Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability of
building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. The
Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect a new focus on theater
missile defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense.
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The Bush Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to reflect
its interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111).  The concept of
placing weapons in space as part of a missile defense system remains controversial.  Whether
missile defense weapons ultimately are based in space or on the ground, a missile defense
system would require satellites for early warning, communications, and other functions. 
Interagency Coordination
Several mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space policy.
Dissatisfied with the Reagan Administration’s approach of using a Senior Interagency Group
(SIG/Space) under the National Security Council (NSC), in the FY1989 NASA authorization
act (P.L. 100-685), Congress re-created the National Space Council.  The original council,
which included aeronautics, was created in the 1958 Space Act, and abolished by President
Nixon in 1973. Under President George H. W. Bush, the Space Council was headed by Vice
President Quayle.   President Clinton decided to merge the Space Council functions into a
National Science and Technology Council, administered through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.  It oversaw civil and commercial space policy; while military space
activities were overseen by the National Security Council.  The Space Council still exists in
law, but it is not staffed or funded.  Some space advocates hoped President George W. Bush
would reactivate the Space Council, but a mechanism called a Policy Coordinating
Committee under the National Security Council (similar to SIG/Space) was chosen instead.
On July 28, 2002, in NSPD-15, President Bush directed the NSC to chair a review of
national space policies.   The first, on commercial remote sensing, was signed April 25,
2003.  Two others, on launch vehicles and overall national space policy, are pending.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites.  By that criterion, Russia, the United States, China,
Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, and the European Space Agency (ESA) are members.  ESA
developed the Ariane launch vehicle; Ariane launches are conducted by the French company
Arianespace.   These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation in space, as well as competition.  The 15 members of ESA are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA may conduct international space
activities.  Most NASA programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan, in particular, have
participated in many cooperative space programs with NASA.  They also compete with U.S.
companies in some space areas.  Europe, India, Ukraine, and Russia compete in launch
services for placing satellites into orbit.  France, Russia, India and Israel compete in satellite
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Does not include Transition  Quarter.  See text for other notes.
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention.  Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense.  The main area of competition today seems to
be on  the economic front, although Russian and Ukrainian companies have joint ventures
with U.S. firms to provide launch services, so economic cooperation also exists.
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of U.S. government space funding goes to NASA and DOD.  This  table
shows NASA and DOD
space funding, but must
be used cautiously.
Tracking the DOD
space budget is difficult
since space is not
specifically identified as
a line item in the DOD








1996, the Director of
Central Intelligence
decided for the first time to classify the NRO funding figure so total figures for DOD space
spending were not available for more than a year.  In the summer of 1997, the Administration
finally released a number for the total DOD FY1996 space budget, $11.5 billion, but at the
same time revised numbers downward for FY1992-1995 without explanation.   This table
shows the data as provided in the FY2000 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President
(released in 2002), with additional data from NASA’s FY2004 budget estimate (including
out-year projections), and from DOD for FY2000-2003 DOD space spending figures and out-
year projections.  DOD’s space budget for FY2002 was $15.7 billion, for FY2003 is $18.4
billion, and the FY2004 request is $20.4 billion.  NASA received $14.9 billion in FY2002;
$15.3 billion in FY2003; and the FY2004 request is $15.5 billion.  All NASA figures include
aeronautics funding, ranging from $400 million-$1 billion annually in recent years.
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues
The space shuttle Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 undoubtedly will be the focus
of attention at NASA for some time.  Apart from the human tragedy, there are practical
aspects of grounding the shuttle fleet that affect the space station and the Hubble Space
Telescope programs.  The shuttle is used to service Hubble (the next servicing mission was
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scheduled for 2004), and  takes crews and cargo to and from the International Space Station
(ISS), which is under construction in orbit.  The Columbia tragedy and questions arising from
it are discussed in CRS Report RS21408, CRS Issue Brief IB93017, and CRS Issue Brief
IB93062, and will not be repeated here. The key question from a NASA-wide standpoint is
what impact the Columbia tragedy may have on the agency, and on the space program
overall, as the public and policy makers debate the benefits of human space exploration
versus its risks and costs.  Some may argue that more emphasis should be placed on robotic
exploration instead of risking human lives, while others may view the tragedy as the time to
recommit to the vision of human space exploration as humanity’s destiny. 
NASA conducts many other activities separate from human spaceflight, and issues may
arise with some of those programs, too.  For example, NASA is requesting $279 million in
FY2004  for Project Prometheus, which is the combination of NASA’s Nuclear System
Initiative (NSI) and a Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO).  The 5-year (FY2004-2008) budget
projection for Project Prometheus is $3 billion. NASA estimates that JIMO would be
launched in 2012 to 2013, and the total estimated program cost through 2012 is $8-9 billion,
although NASA stresses that the estimate is very preliminary.  The NSI portion of Project
Prometheus was approved in the FY2003 budget, and will develop space nuclear power and
propulsion for planetary spacecraft.  JIMO, a new request in the FY2004 budget, is a
spacecraft designed to successively orbit three of Jupiter’s moons (Europa, Callisto, and
Ganymede) to determine if liquid water is present beneath their surfaces. Water is essential
to life, and the discovery of liquid water would suggest the possibility of that life.  NASA
had been planning a mission to Europa, which was supported by the planetary science
community and Congress.  In the FY2003 budget, however, NASA canceled the Europa
mission because it was too expensive.  The decision to initiate an even more expensive
mission may raise questions.  Congress did appropriate $20 million for JIMO in the FY2003
Consolidated  Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7), however, even though NASA did not
request funding for it in FY2003.  Congress approved NASA’s request to initiate the NSI,
but cut $19 million from the $125 million request.   It should be noted that in the FY2004
budget, NASA moved to “full cost accounting” where personnel and facilities costs are
included in program budgets, instead of being accounted for separately, as in the past.  Thus,
FY2003 (and prior) budget figures are not directly comparable to FY2004 figures.  See CRS
Report RL31821 for a discussion of full cost accounting and other changes in NASA’s
budget structure in FY2004.
In addition to programmatic issues, NASA also is seeking to address human capital
challenges stemming from its aging workforce.  Human capital is a government-wide issue
addressed in the President’s Management Agenda, but NASA is hoping that, in the wake of
the Columbia tragedy,  Congress will pass legislation providing it more flexibility in hiring
and retaining workers without waiting for broader legislation for the entire government.  H.R.
1085 (Boehlert) and S. 610 (Voinovich) address NASA specifically.  H.R. 1836 (Davis)
addresses NASA, DOD, and the Security and Exchange Commission.
Military Space Issues
During the Clinton Administration, questions arose about whether DOD was effectively
managing its space activities. Congress created a commission in the FY2000 DOD
authorization bill to make recommendations on the overall management of national security
space programs.  Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the Commission released its report on
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January 11, 2001, shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense.  The Rumsfeld
Commission (or “Space Commission”) made sweeping recommendations for management
of DOD and intelligence community space programs (see CRS Report RS20824 for a
synopsis).  Some observers believed that implementation of the recommendations was
moving slowly.  GAO has issued two reports (GAO-02-772, June 2002; GAO-03-379, April
2003) summarizing the status of implementation of those recommendations.  According to
GAO, DOD intends to implement 10 of the 13 Rumsfeld Space Commission organizational
recommendations, and by April 2003, nine had been implemented. GAO added that is too
early to assess the results of the organizational changes.
Meanwhile, DOD’s space budget is growing significantly—from $15.7 billion in
FY2002, to a FY2004 request of $20.4 billion, to a projected $28.6 billion in FY2008.  Some
of that will be needed to address increased funding requirements for existing DOD space
programs that are encountering technical and schedule challengers—such as the Space Based
Infrared System and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System discussed below—but if
the anticipated increases are realized, new initiatives could be supported as well.
Early Warning Satellites: the SBIRS/STSS Programs.  Among the most
prominent DOD space programs are efforts to develop new early warning satellites (see CRS
Report RS21148).   Briefly, DOD is attempting to develop more capable satellites to provide
early warning of foreign missile launches, and to support missile defense objectives.   The
Space Based InfraRed System (SBIRS) was proposed and approved in the FY1996 DOD
budget.   It evolved to envision satellites in both high orbits and low orbits.  The high orbit
system, SBIRS-High, is managed by the Air Force, and would replace existing Defense
Support Program satellites, with the primary goal of detecting missiles when they are
launched.  The low orbit system was called SBIRS-Low, but was renamed the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in 2002.  It is managed by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), and would track missiles from launch to intercept or reentry; track warheads
deployed from the missiles; discriminate between warheads and decoys; and pass data to
other systems that would attempt to intercept and destroy the missiles or warheads.
SBIRS-High and STSS have each encountered technical challenges, schedule delays,
and cost increases.  Congress has expressed concern about the programs for several years,
and in the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-117),  reduced funding for both. Both
programs were restructured during the FY2003 budget process.  For  SBIRS-High ,  in
FY2003 Congress cut $30 million from the $815 million requested (an 85% increase over
FY2002 funding) in the FY2003 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 107-248 .  The FY2003 DOD
authorization act (P.L. 107-314) cut it by $40 million.   For SBIRS-Low, the FY2003 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 107-248) and authorization act (P.L. 107-314) approved the full
$294 million requested.   
For FY2004, DOD is requesting $617 million for SBIRS-High research and
development, plus $95 million for procurement of a backup mission control station.  For
STSS (formerly SBIRS-Low), DOD is requesting $300 million, but is also requesting
funding to assess ground- and sea-based alternatives to it.   The Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) approved the SBIRS-High funding, but cut STSS by $15.5 million
because of “unjustified” growth in program management costs (S. 1050).  The House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) added $15 million for SBIRS-High RDT&E, and approved the
requested funding for STSS (H.R. 1588).
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Space-Based Lasers and Space-Based Kinetic Energy Weapons for
Boost-Phase Missile Defense.   Space-based lasers (SBL) and space-based kinetic
energy (KE) “hit-to-kill”weapons have been of interest in the context of missile defense since
President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) program in 1983.
Conceptually, these weapons would be able to attack missiles while they are still in their
boost phase (from launch until burnout), prior to when warheads or decoys are deployed.
Funding for research on SBL has waxed and waned over the years.  From 1995-2001,
Congress added funds to the DOD request for SBL ($50 million in FY1996, $70 million in
FY1997, $98 million in FY1998, and $74 million in FY1999). Congress directed DOD in
the FY1999 DOD authorization conference report to release promptly a request for proposals
(RFP) for a space based laser readiness demonstrator, but the Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board concluded that technology was not sufficiently advanced to proceed with it.  A
Boeing-Lockheed Martin-TRW team jointly began work on the demonstrator, called the
Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX), and Congress approved $148.8 million for FY2000, and
$148 million for FY2001. 
 In FY2002, SBL was transferred from the Air Force to the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO, now the Missile Defense Agency).   BMDO requested $165 million
for IFX, plus $5 million for SBL optics, but Congress cut $120 million in the FY2002 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 107-117), effectively killing IFX. Funding for technology work
continued in FY2002 and FY2003 ($49 million and $25 million respectively).  In the
FY2004 budget, SBL work has been folded into the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s)
technology budget and is not identified separately.
The FY2002 budget also included funds for BMDO to resume work on space-based
kinetic energy (KE)  weapons: $5 million for experiment design and $15 million for concept
definition.   The FY2002 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 107-117) cut $10 million.  The
FY2003 request was $54 million, which was approved in the FY2003 DOD appropriations
act (P.L. 107-248), but cut by $21.3 million in the authorization act (P.L. 107-314).   In
FY2004, the space-based KE interceptor effort has been folded into the overall BMD
interceptors line and is not identified separately.
Antisatellite Weapons and Space Control.  DOD has a long standing interest in
developing capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to
adversaries.  For many years, antisatellite (ASAT) weapons designed to attack other satellites
in orbit were viewed as the primary means for denying the use of space to adversaries.   More
recently, the term “space control” has come into use.  Although ASATs are one means of
space control, the latter term includes other methods of denying the use of space to
adversaries, such as jamming satellite command links, or destroying ground control and
launch infrastructure.    One disadvantage of ASAT weapons is that they may create debris
that could damage other satellites.  In  2001, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space
Command expressed reservations about using “kinetic energy” ASATs because of the
collateral damage that could be inflicted on U.S. government and commercial satellites
(Aerospace Daily, March 29, 2001).  
An Air Force ASAT development program, using F-15 based interceptors, was
terminated in the 1980s because of limitations set by Congress on testing the system.  An
Army ground-based kinetic-energy ASAT (KEAsat) program was later initiated, but was
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terminated by the Clinton Administration in 1993 ( although technology studies continued).
DOD has not requested KEAsat funding since then, focusing instead on other space control
methods.  Congress has supported DOD budget requests for space control technology
funding, but also revived the KEAsat program in FY1996, adding $30 million that year, $50
million in FY1997, $37.5 million in FY1998, $7.5 million in FY2000, and $3 million in
FY2001.  No KEAsat funding has been requested since, and none added by Congress.
However, in its report on the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (S. 1050), SASC
recommended adding $4 million to the funding requested for space control in order to assess
and evaluate KEAsat technologies as part of a space control architecture, and to develop
space control technologies that leverage KEAsat capabilities and the investments already
made in KEAsat.
Funding for space control continues.   In FY1999, Congress added $15 million for space
control, and allowed some of the $37.5 million allocated to KEAsat to be spent on space
control.  Congress added $3 million to the $9.8 million requested for space control
technology for FY2002;  approved the $9.7 million requested for FY2001; approved $32.3
million of the $33 million requested for FY2002; and approved DOD’s FY2003 request for
space control technology of $13.8 million, as well as $40 million for a new “counterspace
systems” line item.  Counterspace systems support transition of some space control activities
into the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.  The FY2004 request for
space control is $14.7 million, and for counterspace systems is $82.6 million. As noted
above, SASC would increase the $14.7 million by $4 million (S. 1050).   HASC approved
the requested funding level (H.R. 1588).
NRO and NIMA.  Another aspect of national security space activities involves the
NRO.  Revelations beginning in September 1995 about poor financial management at NRO
led to a review by a panel chaired by retired Admiral David Jeremiah. The 1997 Jeremiah
report made 47 recommendations. Some were adopted while others were referred for further
study.  In response to continuing concerns, the FY2000 intelligence authorization act (P.L.
106-120) established a National Commission on the Review of the National Reconnaissance
Office.  That Commission’s November 2000 report found that NRO requires the personal
attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence
and must remain a strong, separate activity focused on innovation.  The Commission warned
that without such support, significant intelligence failures could result. 
In the late 1990s, recognizing that future budgets could be constrained, NRO adopted
the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) plan calling for developing more, smaller, less
expensive intelligence collection satellites.   In the conference report on the FY2003
intelligence authorization bill (H.Rept. 107-789), Congress expressed deep concern about
the FIA, saying that technical and funding problems could force “untenable trades between
critical future capabilities and legacy systems.”  In its report on the FY2004 DOD
authorization bill (S. 1050), SASC added $14 million to accelerate “tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination” (TPED) components of the FIA to support tactical and
operational users.  DOD and the intelligence community are augmenting the data provided
by NRO systems with commercial imagery (discussed earlier).  According to press reports,
for FY2003, Congress increased the budget available to NIMA for purchase of commercial
imagery by 13 times (dollar figures were not released).  The new Bush Administration policy
on commercial remote sensing directs governments agencies to use commercial imagery to
the maximum extent possible.
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Space-Based Radar. The FY2001 DOD appropriations  (P.L. 106-259) and
authorization (P.L. 106-398) acts terminated the Air Force-NRO-Army Discoverer II
program that was to involve the launch of two satellites to demonstrate the ability of radar
satellites to track mobile (as opposed to fixed) targets on the ground.  Instead, $30 million
was provided to NRO to develop and mature technologies for such a purpose.  Concerns
included whether technology was sufficiently mature; the potential cost of an operational
system (the House Appropriations Committee estimated it at $25 billion); and whether DOD
could use all the resulting data.  For FY2002, Congress appropriated $25 million for space-
based radar development instead of the $50 million requested.  For FY2003, it approved the
$48 million requested in the Air Force RDT&E account, but did not approve another $43
million requested in the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF).   The FY2004 request
is $274 million.  In its report on the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (S. 1050), SASC
approved the requested funding and directed DOD to assess the contribution SBR could
make to missile defense.  HASC approved the requested funding level (H.R. 1588).
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062.  Briefly, a 1994 Clinton Administration policy directive gave NASA primary
responsibility for maintaining the reusable space shuttle and developing new reusable launch
vehicles (RLVs), while DOD is responsible for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).  Private
sector companies also are developing new launch vehicles on their own or in partnership
with the government.  U.S. government satellites must be launched on U.S. launch vehicles
unless the President grants a waiver.  Government and commercial customers in the United
States and commercial customers abroad purchase launch services from launch service
companies in the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Ukraine, or India.
NASA has been attempting since the 1980s to develop a new RLV to replace the space
shuttle that would cost less and have improved safety.  Several programs were started and
later abandoned.  The most recent program is the Space Launch Initiative (SLI).  Initially,
SLI was designed to fund several companies to develop new RLV technologies, leading to
a 2006 decision on what new vehicle to build that would be safer and more cost effective.
In November 2002, NASA  refocused the SLI program on developing an Orbital Space Plane
to take crews to and from the space station.  The space plane will use an existing ELV rather
than a new RLV.  Lowering launch costs is no longer an SLI goal.  NASA also announced
that it would fund upgrades to the space shuttle to ensure it can safely operate until at least
2015 and perhaps 2020 and beyond, instead of phasing out the shuttle in 2012 as earlier
planned.  Whether that will be impacted by the space shuttle Columbia accident or not is
unclear at this time. See CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
DOD pursued the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade
U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs by at least 25%.  Lockheed Martin
and Boeing each built EELVs—the Atlas 5 and the Delta 4, both of which have now
successfully launched satellites.  The companies and DOD shared the development costs,
although the companies now are seeking to recoup some of their expenses from DOD in the
wake of a downturn in the forecast for commercial launch services that had been expected
to be a source of revenue.  DOD is supportive of industry’s position, asserting that by
ensuring the health of both companies, it will have “assured access to space” should technical
problems arise with one of the vehicles.  Of its $609 million request for EELV procurement
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in FY2004, $157 million is for assured access. SASC fully supported this philosophy in its
report on the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (S. 1050), and added another $60 million.
HASC approved the requested funding level (H.R. 1588).
 
Several private companies are attempting to develop their own launch vehicles,
although market conditions make it difficult to raise financing.  Title IX of the FY2003 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 107-248) created a loan guarantee program for companies
developing in-orbit space transportation systems that could move satellites from one orbit
to another (but not launch them from Earth into orbit).
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
Commercial space launch issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.  Briefly,
the role of the government in encouraging the growth of commercial space businesses either
by direct or indirect subsidies, or policies that help stave off foreign competitors, continues
to be debated.  Some argue that the government provides indirect subsidies to launch services
companies by allowing them to use government launch sites at nominal costs and providing
a guaranteed market for a certain number of launches.  Others insist that the U.S. government
is doing no more than foreign governments.
The main competitors to U.S. companies today are Europe, China, Russia, and Ukraine
(Ukraine’s Zenit launch vehicle is used for the international Sea Launch joint venture that
also includes Boeing, Russia’s Energia, and Norway’s Kvaerner). Most of the satellites that
require launches are built in the United States or contain U.S. components, meaning export
licenses are required to ship them to the launch site.  Thus, the United States has substantial
leverage over the success of these competitors in offering launch services.  Bilateral
agreements were signed with China, Russia, and Ukraine setting forth the conditions under
which they offer launch services, both the price they can charge compared to Western prices
and setting quotas on the number of launches.  The quotas have since been eliminated for
Russia and Ukraine, and the agreement with China expired at the end of 2001.   Concerns
that China acquired militarily useful information by launching U.S.-built satellites  resulted
in new U.S. laws and regulations to ensure such technology or information is not transferred
to China or other countries.  Aerospace industry representatives argue the new regulations
are hurting U.S. satellite manufacturing companies because customers may chose non-U.S.
companies to build satellites rather than deal with U.S. export laws. (See CRS Issue Brief
IB93062.)  As discussed, another commercial space issue concerns the sale of commercial
remote sensing data with very good resolution. At issue is how to allow U.S. companies to
compete in this market without sacrificing national security interests.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation.  Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed
political circumstances, but also of constrained budgets throughout the world.  All the major
space-faring countries are questioning how much they should invest in space.  The same





P.L. 108-7, H.J.Res. 2 (Young)
FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution.  Includes FY2003 funding for NASA
as part of the VA-HUD-IA portion.   Passed House January 8, 2003; passed Senate January
23.   Conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) passed House and Senate February 13, 2003.
Signed into law February 20.
H.R. 1085 (Boehlert)/S. 610 (Voinovich)
NASA workforce flexibility.  H.R. 1085 (NASA Flexibility Act) introduced March 5,
2003; referred to Committees on Science and Government Reform.  S. 610 (NASA
WorkForce Flexibility Act) introduced March 13, 2003; referred to Committee on
Governmental Affairs.
H.R. 1588 (Hunter)/S. 1050 (Warner)
FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act.  H.R. 1588 reported from House Armed
Services Committee May 16 (H.Rept. 108-106).  S. 1050 reported from Senate Armed
Services Committee May 13 (S.Rept. 108-46).  
H.R. 1836 (Davis)
Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act.  Introduced April 29,
2003.   Referred to House Government Reform, Armed Services, and Science committees.
Reported from House Government Reform Committee May 19, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-116, Pt.
I).
